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Abstract
In the classical models of regulation economics, a mechanism that secures truthful
revelation involves paying a subsidy to the firm. In this paper, we investigate whether it is
possible to create a regulatory mechanism under a no-subsidy constraint that induces the
firm to report its private information truthfully. We consider a number of firms operating
under regulated competition and with increasing returns to scale technology. It is shown
that in equilibrium, each firm chooses to report truthfully without receiving any subsidy.
The use of competition may give rise to an e ciency loss due to the increasing returns to
scale. However, we show that our mechanism may still be better, from a social welfare
point of view, than the case of monopoly regulation that involves no subsidy.
1. Introduction
The interest in regulation of markets characterized by either monopoly or oligopoly has a
long history, see e.g. the survey by Armstrong and Sappington (2007), and the privatization
of formerly government owned and managed industries, mainly in the field of public utilities,
has promoted an increased concern about regulation, often in a context of market failures in
the form of increasing returns to scale or asymmetric information.
In the present paper we consider such a case, where there are increasing returns to scale in
production. In the context of public utilities, this may occur for companies providing services
to the consumer (such as electricity or natural gas) which they either produce themselves
or acquire in a market where large buyers obtain considerable rebates. As is well-known,
optimal allocation in a market with increasing returns to scale occurs at a level of output
where price equals marginal cost, so that pricing according to marginal cost (see e.g. Joskow
(1976)) can be sustained only if the producers are paid a subsidy.
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Throughout this paper, we assume that subsidization of producers is not possible, so that
the welfare optimum cannot be achieved. We shall not discuss reasons for or justification of
this assumption, which is taken as given here as in many other contexts, such as e.g. the theory
of Ramsey pricing (cf. Hagen and Sheshinski (1986)). Even so, regulation serves the purpose
of achieving an allocation which is welfare superior to monopoly or to an oligopolistic equi-
librium for the case with more than one firm. In particular, we shall compare regulation of
a single firm, a monopoly, with a regulated competition between two firms, under the condi-
tions of increasing returns to scale and no subsidization. This comparison is not altogether
trivial, since on the one hand, the increasing returns to scale tend to favor production in a sin-
gle plant, but on the other hand the competition between two firms may lead to lower prices
and larger output.
As mentioned above, we shall assume that there is asymmetric information about produc-
tion cost which is private information for the firm in the case of monopoly and for each firm if
there are several firms. Thus the regulator must try to overcome the informational advantage
of the firm (or firms). In the case of a single firm, this takes us to the theory of regulated
monopoly, now under conditions of increasing returns to scale.
There is a considerable literature on regulation of monopolies under asymmetric informa-
tion. In Loeb and Magat (1979), subsidies are used as incentives to surpass the information
asymmetry, and Baron and Myerson (1982) present a mechanism that induces the regulated
monopoly to report its cost truthfully. We shall use the ideas of Baron and Myerson in our
treatment of regulated monopoly, but since subsidization is not allowed, the regulation which
emerges cannot implement a welfare optimum, and truthful revelation is obtained by allow-
ing the firm a profit which is no less than what could be achieved by misinformation of the
regulator. The loss of welfare due to smaller output and to the deliberate closing down of
production when cost is too high, may be considerable.
As an alternative to the regulated monopoly, we then consider a case with two firms both
engaged in production, a regulated duopoly. Since we have increasing returns to scale, a
marginal cost equilibrium, where price equals marginal cost in each of the two firms, would
entail negative profits in both firms, and negative profits in at least one firm if the regula-
tor is free to redistribute profits between firms, thus, we cannot achieve a welfare optimum
in a regulated duopoly.1 Accepting this, the regulation must come so close to the welfare
maximum as possible without subsidies, meaning that market revenue should equal total cost
of production, possibly with an acceptable profit margin. We consider one such regulation,
where the firms are receiving regulated incomes which allow for transfers of market profits
from one firm to another but no overall subsidization. However, the regulation depends on
the level of cost of the two firms, which is private information, and it is assumed that firms
1The result of Gradstein (1995) about the possibility of achieving a welfare optimum in regulated oligopoly
does not apply when there are increasing returns to scale, since it uses only the first order conditions for profit
maximization, not taking into account the nonnegativity condition.
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send messages about their true cost. Having received the messages, the regulator proceeds
according to the largest of the two messages, but using regulated incomes which favor the
firm with the smallest message. It is shown that truthful revelation is an equilibrium, how-
ever, the firm with the lowest cost can maintain an informational rent since the regulator acts
as if both firms have the higher cost.
The two approaches to regulation of a market with increasing returns to scale and no sub-
sidies are compared using an assessment of their welfare loss (relative the welfare optimum).
In regulated monopoly, this welfare loss is caused by the cases of either producing nothing
(when cost is high) or producing too little (in order to ensure truthful revelation of cost). In
the regulated duopoly, there is also a loss from producing too small an output, even if much
smaller than under monopoly, but to this must be added the loss arising from producing in
two firms instead of in a single firm. The final result depends on the parameter values, so that
the superior market structure must be determined from the circumstances in each practical
application.
As mentioned already, the literature on regulation of monopolistic and oligopolistic mar-
kets is quite considerable, even if only few contributions deal with our particular combination
of increasing returns to scale and asymmetric information about cost. Problems of asymmet-
ric information models have been studied in a variety of contexts, see e.g. Lewis and Sapping-
ton (1988), La↵ont and Tirole (1993) and La↵ont and Martimort (2002). Also the problems
of regulating an oligopolistic market, and in particular a duopoly, has been considered in the
literature. Auriol and La↵ont (1992) consider a duopoly where the e ciency parameters are
private information, and the regulation uses yardstick competition in order to lower the in-
formational rents. Other contributions are Dalen (1998) and Tangerås (2009), showing that
asymmetric information involves informational rents or costs that have to be accepted by the
regulator.
Regulated oligopoly was treated byWolinsky (1997) in the context of spacial competition,
The idea of selecting from potential producers is exploited by Wang (2000) in a model of
regulating an oligopoly with unknown cost, where only firms reporting low cost are allowed
to stay in the market. In Evrenk and Zenginobuz (2010), the duopolists are regulated through
a revenue contest, whereby the firm with lower revenue must transfer some of its profits to
the other firm. The work of Sengupta and Tauman (2011) deals with an oligopolistic market
with increasing returns to scale technology, where the incentive mechanism is based on a
bidding contest, the outcome of which is a contract with subsidies to only one firm, while the
other firms exit the market. An alternative approach to regulation was proposed by Koray and
Sertel (1988), allowing firms to state their cost under the obligation to produce in accordance
with their statements.
As it can be seen, the approach followed in the present paper is one which builds on
an established tradition, even if it di↵ers in combining the three issues of increased return
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to scale, asymmetric information, and no subsidies. However, the main results of the paper
are those dealing with the comparison of alternative market structures, showing that under
suitable conditions on parameters regulated duopoly may be superior to monopoly, even with
increasing returns to scale.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the basic model with its un-
derlying general assumptions. In the following Section 3, we treat the model of regulated
monopoly, following the ideas in Baron and Myerson (1982) but with the additional condi-
tions of increasing returns to scale and no subsidization; the model is illustrated by a numeri-
cal example showing that no output is produced when cost is too high. The main result of this
section is a lower bound for the welfare loss occurring under regulated monopoly. In Section
4, we turn to the case of regulated duopoly, presenting first the rules for income formation
when the cost parameter has been determined, and then the method for determining this pa-
rameter; for comparison, the same numerical example as in the previous section is used to
illustrate the results of regulated duopoly. The welfare assessment is carried on in Section 5,
where we present an upper bound for the welfare loss, which may then be used together with
previous results to compare regulated monopoly and duopoly. This comparison is reconsid-
ered in Section 6 under the assumption that the monopolist is selected as one of two potential
producers according to lowest reported cost. Finally, Section 7 contains some concluding
comments. Proofs of lemmas and propositions are collected in an appendix to the paper.
2. The model
We consider an industry with a technology admitting increasing returns to scale. The number
of firms operating in this industry all have access to the same technology, defined by a cost
function ✓C(q), depending on the level of output q and a multiplicative productivity parameter
✓. The function C is twice di↵erentiable and concave, meaning that there are nondecreasing
returns to scale. The productivity parameter ✓ of the firm, also to be mentioned as its type,
is observed only by the firm itself. It is assumed to be randomly distributed in an interval
⇥ =
h
✓, ✓
i ⇢ R+, with probability distribution function F.
The demand for the output of the industry is described by an inverse demand function
P(q), where P(q) is the price at which the output q can be sold in the market. We assume
that P(q) is non-increasing and convex in q, and that for each ✓ 2 ⇥, there is a unique q such
that P(q)q = ✓C(q). All of these assumptions are satisfied in standard models of industrial
organization.
Consumer satisfaction at production q is given by
V(q) =
Z q
0
P(s) ds, (1)
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and consumer surplus is S (p) = V(q)   P(q)q. The net welfare given that the firm has type ✓
is
W(q, ✓) = V(q)   ✓C(q). (2)
For each ✓ 2 ⇥, q⇤(✓) denotes the production which maximizes W(q, ✓). The maximal ex-
pected welfare is then
U⇤ =
Z
⇥
W(q⇤(✓), ✓) dF(✓).
Due to the increasing returns to scale, we have that P(q⇤(✓))q⇤(✓) < C(q⇤(✓)), so that revenue
does not cover costs of production. If there is only one producer, a regulation which results
in the welfare maximizing production is chosen, meaning that subsidies are needed if the
welfare maximizing production is to be sustained.
In the sequel, two di↵erent ways of regulating this market will be compared, one where
only a single firm is operating, being a regulated monopoly, and another one with two firms
in the market, operating under regulated competition. We are considering only regulation
that does not involve subsidization, the welfare maximizing production cannot be achieved,
and a comparison of the two regimes of regulation must be based on their expected e ciency
losses.
3. Regulated monopoly
Regulation of a monopoly has been investigated, at least for the case of non-increasing returns
to scale. Here we follow the approach of Baron and Myerson (1982), but as we consider
regulation under a no-subsidy constraint, their model is adapted to the purpose.
In a regulated monopoly with no subsidies, the regulator chooses a policy, that is a triple
( , q, r) of functions of ✓, where
(a)  (✓) is the probability that the firm is allowed to market a nonzero output,
(b) q(✓) is the output which the firm should produce, and
(c) r(✓) is the revenue assigned to the producer.
The firm announces a (productivity) type ✓, which may or may not be the true value.
The objective of the regulator is assumed to be maximization of expected net welfare
U( , q, r) =
Z
⇥
W(q(✓), ✓) (✓) dF(✓) (3)
subject to the no-subsidy condition
r(✓)  P(q(✓))q(✓). (4)
Since ✓ cannot be observed by the regulator, the mechanismmust be incentive compatible.
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For each pair (✓, ✓) let
⇡(✓ˆ, ✓) =  (✓ˆ)
h
r(✓ˆ)   ✓C(q(✓ˆ))i ,
be the net income of the producer of type ✓ who states the type ✓ˆ, given the regulatory policy
( , q, r). The incentive compatibility constraint is then
⇡(✓, ✓)   ⇡(✓ˆ, ✓), all ✓, ✓ˆ 2 ⇥. (5)
Also, the mechanism is voluntary in the sense that it satisfies the participation constraint
r(✓)   ✓C(q(✓)), all ✓ 2 ⇥. (6)
It is convenient to reformulate the participation and incentive compatibility constraints
using the following result, where ⇡(✓) = ⇡(✓, ✓) denotes the net income of the producer an-
nouncing true type.
Lemma 1 Let ( , q, r) be a regulatory policy which satisfies the constraints (4)-(6). Then
⇡(✓) = ⇡(✓) +
Z ✓
✓
 (t)C(q(t)) dt
and
 (✓)
⇥
P(q(✓))q(✓)   ✓C(q(✓))⇤   ⇡(✓) + Z ✓
✓
 (t)C(q(t)) dt   0, all ✓ 2 ⇥. (7)
The proof of Lemma 1 (and of the propositions to follow) can be found in the appendix.
The inequality in (7) is useful when assessing the welfare loss arising from a monopoly,
regulated under the no-subsidy constraint: For any given ✓ the output q(✓) falls short of max-
imizing net surplus V(q)   ✓C(q), since P(q)q < ✓C(q) at the maximum of this surplus due
to increasing returns to scale. Moreover, the incentive constraint shows that P(q(✓))q(✓) typi-
cally must exceed ✓C(q(✓)) by a considerable amount, needed to ensure the truthful revelation
of type.
A regulatory policy is optimal if it maximizes (3) subject to the constraints (4)-(6). Some
properties of optimal regulatory policies are listed below.
Lemma 2 Let ( , q, r) be an optimal regulatory policy. Then
(i)  (✓) 2 {0, 1} for all ✓ 2 ⇥,
(ii) there is ✓0 2 ⇥, such that {✓ |  (✓) = 1} = [✓, ✓0],
(iii) for each ✓ with  (✓) = 1, q(✓) 2 [q0, q1], where q0 is defined by P(q0)q0 = ✓0C(q0)
and q1 = sup {q | P(q)q   ✓C(q)   (✓0   ✓)C(q0), ✓  ✓0}.
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As shown by the lemma, in an optimal regulatory policy either production is not carried
out at all or the firm will be asked to produce in the interval [q0, q1] defined in part (iii). The
specific value ✓0 for the largest admissible type and the productions q0 and q1 will be used
repeatedly in the sequel.
As mentioned above, even the optimal regulatory policy will result in a welfare loss as
compared to U⇤. The size of this welfare loss can be assessed using the results stated in the
two preceding lemmas.
Proposition 1 Let ( , q, r) be a regulatory policy which maximizes welfare subject to the con-
straints (4)-(6). Then
P(q(✓))   ✓C0(q(✓))   ✓
0   ✓
q1
C(q0)
for each ✓ with  (✓) = 1, and the welfare loss associated with this policy satisfies the inequal-
ity
U⇤   U( , q, r)  
 
C(q0)
q1
!2 1
2|P0(q0))|
Z ✓0
✓
(✓0   ✓)2 dF(✓). (8)
Example. Suppose that the demand relationship is
P(q) = 3.4   0.2q,
and that the cost function C is given by
C(q) = 2q + ln(5 + q)   ln 5,
which is increasing and concave. We let the interval of types be ⇥ = [0.5, 1.5] and take ✓ to
be uniformly distributed in this interval.
In the regulated monopoly, truthful reporting of type implies that if there is nonzero pro-
duction at some ✓, then the monopolist must be at least as well o↵ at any ✓0 < ✓ as if ✓ was
reported, cf. Lemma 2. In Table 1, this level of output is shown for alternative values of ✓.
The third column shows expected welfare given that the type is  ✓. It is found by adding
the welfare at ✓ in the second column the average di↵erence between cost at ✓ and actual
cost (and then dividing by the length of the interval of type). It is seen that it achieves its
maximum at ✓ = 1.4, so that it is better for society not to produce when ✓ > 1.4, and average
welfare is then 8.51.
For comparison, the optimal production choices under unregulated monopoly have been
inserted for the selected values of ✓. Output and welfare will be considerably smaller than
what is achieved under the regulation. Approximating average welfare using the means of the
intervals in the table gives a value of 7.65, which should be compared to the 8.51 achieved
under regulation. Thus, regulating a monopoly, even with no subsidization, makes sense from
a welfare point of view.
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Table 1. Production and welfare under regulated and unregulated monopoly
Regulated Unregulated
Break-even Welfare Average welfare qm(✓) Welfare
✓ output at ✓ at ✓ over all ✓0  ✓ (monopoly)
0.5 13.51 18.25 0 6.77 13.60
0.75 11.76 13.78 3.96 5.90 10.24
1.0 9.95 9.90 6.70 5.00 7.30
1.25 8.13 6.61 8.20 4.10 4.84
1.4 7.05 4.93 8.51 3.58 3.62
1.5 6.28 3.94 8.43 2.15 2.84
It is not surprising that an incentive scheme under which the producer must be granted a
share in the profits su ciently big to induce truthful revelation of preferences will result in a
welfare loss when compared to marginal cost pricing which even without incentive schemes
is sustainable only with subsidies paid to the firm. The point is not so much that there is a
welfare loss; rather we want to compare this welfare loss with what obtains if there is some
regulated competition in the market. In the next section, we consider one such situation.
4. Regulated duopoly
In this section, we consider a method of regulating the market which di↵ers markedly from
the case treated above, since the regulator allows for more than one firm operating. In the
context of increasing returns to scale, this entails an e ciency loss; on the other hand, the
absence of subsidies will in some situations make the duopoly solution preferable from a
social welfare point of view. As before, the technology of the firms is described by their type
✓ 2 ⇥. For the time being, we assume that ✓ is determined at the industry level, so that the
two firms have the same ✓, which however is not observable to the regulator. At a later stage,
we consider the case of firm-specific productivity parameters.
Since there are increasing returns to scale, the regulation must counteract the inherent
tendency towards concentrating production in a single unit, so that it must treat the two firms
di↵erently as long as one firm produces more than another. Let q1 and q2 be the production
choices of the two firms, with q1   q2. Then the market revenue is P(q1 + q2)(q1 + q2) and
total cost is ✓C(q1) + ✓C(q2); the regulator is constrained by an overall no-subsidy constraint
P(q1 + q2)(q1 + q2)   [✓C(q1) + ✓C(q2)]   0, (9)
meaning that profits may be transferred from one producer to another as long as the overall
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non-subsidy constraint (9) is not violated. We let D denote the set of all (✓, q1, q2) with ✓ 2 ⇥
and q1   q2 for which (9) is satisfied.
In order to induce firms to choose productions which are as large as possible, the reg-
ulator remunerates the firms according to cost plus a percentage markup, as long as this is
compatible with (9). Let   > 0 be a percentage markup on cost in the two firms, kept fixed
throughout this section. If (✓, q1, q2) 2 D, then the regulated income of firm 1 (the firm with
the largest output) is determined as
r1(q1, q2, ✓) = min {(1 +  )✓C(q1), P(q1 + q2)q1} , (10)
so that the firm receives a reimbursement of its cost plus the proportional allowance for prof-
its, as long as this does not exceed the revenue obtained from selling its output. The smaller
firm 2 is regulated in a slightly di↵erent way, namely by
r2(q1, q2, ✓) =
8>>><>>>:(1 +  )✓C(qi)   c if P(q1 + q2)(q1 + q2)   (1 +  )✓
⇥
C(q1) +C(q2)
⇤
,
P(q1 + q2)q2   c otherwise,
(11)
where c   0 is a constant which will be specified in the sequel. Thus, firm 2 is reimbursed
according to its cost plus allowed profits as long as this remuneration is consistent with the
principle of no subsidization of the market. This regulation gives a certain advantage to the
smaller firm, allowing for expansion of its production if the large producer gets a profit which
exceeds than   times its cost.
When regulated according to (10)-(11), the net income of firm i is
⇡i(q1, q2, ✓) = ri(q1, q2, ✓)   ✓C(qi), i = 1, 2. (12)
The pair (q01, q
0
2) of productions is an equilibrium for the regulation if q
0
1   q02 > 0 (so that
both firms are producing nonzero output), and no firm has a profitable deviation,
⇡1(q01, q
0
2, ✓)   ⇡1(q1, q02, ✓), all q1   0, (13)
⇡2(q01, q
0
2, ✓)   ⇡2(q01, q2, ✓), all q2   0, (14)
so that (q01, q
0
2) is a Nash equilibrium in the game  d(✓) with strategies qi   0, i = 1, 2, and
payo↵s given by (12). Thus, for the purposes of regulation, a particular value of ✓ has been
selected. We are particularly interested in the case where this selected value is the true type
of firm 2 but not necessarily of firm 1.
Proposition 2 Let ✓ 2 ⇥. Then the following hold:
(i) If both firms have type ✓, then there is a unique equilibrium (q01, q
0
2), it satisfies q
0
1 =
9
q02 = qd and
P(2q0d)q
0
d = (1 +  )✓C(q
0
d).
(ii) If firm 1 has type ✓0  ✓, while firm 2 has type ✓, then (q0d, q0d) is also a Nash equilibrium
in the game where firm 2 has payo↵ given by
r1(q1, q2, ✓)   ✓0C(q1).
q
qq 12
P(q  + q  )q21
2
1
P(q  + q  )q21
(1 +  λ)θC(q)
θC(q)
Fig. 1
The workings of the regulation are in Fig.1. The situation depicted is not an equilibrium;
while firm 1 cannot do better given the choice of production q2 of the other firm, there is room
for improvement for firm 2. Indeed, production can be expanded as long as the profits of the
first firm exceeds   times its cost, as it does in the case depicted. It is easily seen that firm 2
will retain this inducement to expand production until its output equals that of the other firm.
In the sequel, we let qd(✓) denote the common output in the symmetric equilibrium at
✓ 2 ⇥. We notice that qd(✓) is a continuous function of the type parameter. Furthermore, it is
seen that the equilibrium payo↵s
⇡i(✓) = ⇡i(qd(✓), qd(✓), ✓), i = 1, 2,
are nondecreasing function of ✓: When ✓ gets smaller, output is increased and revenue falls
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while cost increases.
We now extend the income regulation scheme to a mechanism for determining production
in the case where types are firm-specific so that the two firms may have di↵erent type. In this
case, the regulator must select a suitable value of ✓. We assume that firms submit messages
about their type, after which they are assigned numbers 1 or 2 to the firms according to
their stated productivity parameters. The regulation of income is performed according to the
largest of the stated values, but with firm 1 receiving a larger income than firm 2. Formally,
we define the two-stage regulated duopoly as follows: In the first stage, the firms A and B
submit types ✓ˆA, ✓ˆB. The messages submitted induce an ordering of the firms, whereby the
number 1 is assigned to the firm having submitted the smallest type (using random selection
with equal probability in the case that ✓ˆA = ✓ˆB). The firms are then regulated according to the
largest of the two submitted types. Letting
✓1 = min{✓ˆA, ✓ˆB}, ✓2 = max{✓ˆA, ✓ˆB},
in the second stage the two firms choose productions subject to the regulations r1(q1, q2, ✓2)
for the first firm and r2(q1, q2, ✓2) for the second firm, with the constant in (11) defined as
c(✓1, ✓2) = ⇡1(✓2)   ⇡1(✓1)
so that in the equilibrium with outputs (qd(✓2), qd(✓2)), firm 2 gets the payo↵ ⇡1(✓1) which is
smaller than ⇡1(✓2).
Since the game is one of incomplete information, with firms observing only their own
productivity type but not that of the other firm, the relevant equilibrium concept is that of a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium: For each firm, strategies are functions which for each possible
type specify the message to be submitted and the production to be chosen given the messages
submitted in the first stage. A pair of strategies constitute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if for
each player and each possible type of this player, the strategy chosen maximizes expected
payo↵ (where expectation is taken over the types of the other player), given the strategy of
the other player.
Proposition 3 Truth-telling, ✓ˆi = ✓i for i = A, B, followed by selection of the symmetric
duopoly production qd(✓2), for each player, is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the two-stage
regulated duopoly.
This result tells us that our mechanism goes some way in the direction of revealing true
e↵ectivity parameters; for each firm, stating the true productivity type is as good a message as
any other one no matter what the other firmmight state. In order to obtain the true types, some
ine ciency has to be accepted, since the firm with the largest output is regulated according to
a productivity parameter which has a higher value than the true one. This e ciency loss looks
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much the one which occurred when regulating a monopoly, but there is a crucial di↵erence: In
the duopoly, the firm can hide the true productivity parameter only up to the value disclosed
by the other firm, whereas the monopolist can hide it more thoroughly, as no other values are
revealed.
Example (continued). With the specifications of P, C, ⇥ and F given in the example of the
previous section, we can find the equilibrium outputs q(✓) of the two firms at each ✓ solving
the equation
P(2q(✓))2q(✓)   2✓C(q(✓)) = 0.
The solutions are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Production and welfare under regulated and unregulated duopoly
Regulated Unregulated
Welfare Average welfare Duopoly Welfare
✓ qd(✓) at 2qd(✓) given ✓2  ✓ output (duopoly)
0.5 6.72 18.04 18.04 4.50 16.01
0.75 5.85 13.51 17.18 3.91 11.98
1.0 4.90 9.61 14.42 3.30 8.49
1.25 3.98 6.32 12.15 2.69 5.58
1.5 3.05 3.69 10.20 2.06 3.24
As was to be expected, there is a welfare loss connected with producing in two firms in-
stead of a single one when the true parameter ✓ is known to the regulator, but the regulated
duopoly makes up for this loss by allowing for nonzero output for all values of the type pa-
rameter. On the other hand, since regulation follows ✓2, the largest of the two type parameters,
low values of ✓2 occur only with a small probability, and the average welfare obtained must
be computed with respect to the distribution of the largest of to draws. This gives an average
of 10.20, which is greater than the 8.51 obtained in the regulated monopoly.
As in the case of monopoly, Table 2 shows the outputs in the symmetric Cournot-Nash
equilibrium for each of the given values of the productivity parameter ✓, and once more it is
seen that welfare is higher when the market is regulated by our mechanism. We have shown
only the results obtained when the two firms have the same type, which however give an
impression of the general situation. For all values of ✓, welfare is lower without regulation
than in the regulated case.
A more detailed comparison of the e ciency losses occurring under regulated monopoly
and duopoly will be given in the next section.
12
5. Welfare assessment of regulated duopoly and monopoly
In the previous section, a model of regulated duopoly was developed where competition
between firms results in revelation of productivity, at least insofar that the largest of the
two productivity parameters can be used to regulate output. However, producing in two
firms instead of in a single one entails an e ciency loss, which may o↵set the gain from
competiton. So in order to compare the two ways of organizing the production, a more
detailed analysis will be needed.
As a first step, we derive a counterpart of Proposition 1 for the regulated duopoly. For
this, we shall use an assumption ofmoderately increasing returns to scale: Although marginal
cost is decreasing, it does not decrease too fast. More specifically, we assume that there is a
constant ⌘ > 0 such that       C(q)q  C0(q0)
       ⌘ for q   q0, (15)
where q0 is the quantity defined in Lemma 2.
Under this assumption, we may prove the following result.
Lemma 3 Assume that increasing returns to scale are moderate in the sense of (15). Let
✓1  ✓2 be the types of the two firms. If the markup   is small enough, then
P(2qd(✓2))   ✓2C0(2qd(✓2))  ✓2⌘. (16)
In the following, we shall apply Lemma 3 to bound the welfare loss arising under regu-
lated duopoly, and therefore we assume from now on that the markup   is small. The assess-
ment in (16) provides us with an upper bound for the di↵erence between price and marginal
cost in the duopoly equilibrium. With suitable assumptions on demand and cost functions,
this may be used to show that the duopoly solution comes closer to optimum than does regu-
lated monopoly if the productivity parameter has the value ✓2. However, such a comparison
is insu cient for several reasons: It uses the largest of the two parameters stated by the two
firms as the relevant parameter in the monopoly case, and in addition it neglects the allocative
e ciency caused by producing in two instead of one firm.
A comparison of the two ways of arranging production must be based on averages, since
two types are drawn randomly in the duopoly case. We denote by G the distribution of the
largest of the two randomly drawn types.
Proposition 4 Assume that increasing returns to scale are moderate. Then expected welfare
loss of the regulated duopoly is smaller than that of regulated monopoly if"
C(q0)
q1
#2 1
|P0(q0)|
Z ✓0
✓
(✓0   ✓)2 dF(✓) > (3⌘)
2
|P0(q1)|
Z
⇥
✓2 dG(✓), (17)
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where ⌘ is defined by (15) and the quantities q0, q1 in Lemma 2.
The constants preceding the integral signs on the two sides of the inequality (17) are of
roughly comparable size, in particular if both demand P(·) and marginal cost C(·) are approx-
imately constant. In that case the value of integrals will be decisive for whether inequality in
(17) holds or not. Since small values of ✓ contribute more to the integral on the right-hand
side than to that on the left-hand side, we expect regulated duopoly to be superior to regulated
monopoly when the small values of ✓ are more likely to occur than larger values.
It may be added that using the method of regulated duopoly, which selects productions
which balance cost and revenue, yields a better result from a welfare point of view than the
unregulated monopoly, where output is further reduced so as to support maximal profit, at
least as long as the e ciency loss from producing in two firms instead of in a single firm is
not too large. Thus, the regulation considered will be justified in terms of improvement of
welfare. An additional advantage of regulated duopoly will emerge if consumer welfare is
weighted higher than profits of producers. In the regulated monopoly, the producer is left
with a considerable profit earned as informational rent. In the regulated duopoly, only one of
the firms gets this type of profits, and prices tend to be lower, consumer surplus larger than
under monopoly.
6. Welfare assessment with firms competing for monopoly
It might be argued that the assessment which was made in the previous section was inherently
unfavorable to the monopoly solution, since basically we compare a two-firm market with
another one where only single firm is present. Taking averages over types we introduce an
asymmetry, drawing two types at random in one case and only one in the other case.
This may be remedied if in our treatment of regulated monopoly we add another feature,
namely a competition between two potential producers for obtaining the right to produce as a
regulated monopolist. Formally, there are now two firms A and B, and both submit messages
of the form ✓ˆ 2 ⇥. Based on the messages submitted, the producing firm is appointed as the
firm submitting the smallest message, ✓1 = min{✓ˆA, ✓ˆB}, and this firm is regulated according
to the regulatory policy of section 3, but based on the largest of the two messages, ✓2 =
max{✓ˆA, ✓ˆB}. More specifically, production and regulated revenue for the winning firm are set
to
(q(✓2), r(✓2)) if ✓2  ✓0 or ✓1 > ✓0
(q(✓0), r(✓0)) if ✓1  ✓0 < ✓2,
(18)
and nothing is produced if ✓1 > ✓0.
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It may be considered as somewhat unrealistic that the regulator, having obtained infor-
mation about productivities, chooses to proceed as if the true value of ✓ for the winning
firm could be anything below ✓0, which indeed is the principle behind the optimal regulatory
policy ( , q, r). The main advantage of our approach is an equilibrium strategy.
Proposition 5 In the mechanism for selecting a monopolist according to smallest reported
type and regulating selected firm according to (18), stating the true type is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
Due to collection of messages from the potential firms, the regulator obtains some infor-
mation about true productivity parameters, in particular since the true types are equilibrium
messages, as is indeed the case, see below. However, the regulator is committed by the rules
of the game to follow the policy ( , q, r), acting as if the producing firm could conceal its
true productivity. Therefore, this mechanism should be considered as a somewhat artificial
one, being used here mainly for the purpose of comparison, and it cannot be considered as
a candidate for an optimal regulation policy when a single producer is selected from several
candidates.
With these reservations we state our last result on comparing monopoly and duopoly un-
der regulation with subject to the no-subsidy constraint. Repeating the steps of the reasoning
leading to Proposition 4, taking into consideration that the regulation of the monopolist takes
the range of type parameters to be bounded at the largest of the two types, we get an assess-
ment of the following form.
Proposition 6 Assume that increasing returns to scale are moderate. Then expected welfare
loss of the regulated duopoly is smaller than that of regulated monopoly with selection if 
C(q0)
q1
!2 1
|P0(q0)|
Z ✓0
✓
(Z ✓2
✓
1
F(✓2)
(✓0   ✓1)2 dF(✓1)
)
dF(✓2) >
(3⌘)2
|P0(q1)|
Z
⇥
✓2 dG(✓), (19)
where ⌘ is the constant defined in (15) and q0, q1 in Lemma 2.
The inequality (19), which gives conditions for the duopoly solution to be better than
monopoly with selection of active firm, does not di↵er much from (17), and this may seem
surprising given that we have introduced an element of competition between potential produc-
ers. However, the revelation of true types is not exploited fully since the subsequent choice
of output and remuneration of producers follows the original regulatory policy ( , q, r), based
on the absence of information about true types, and a more elaborate version of monopoly
with selection may perform better. On the other hand, the monopoly with selection may
not be an option if there are costs of initiating production, as the presence of such costs
would deter potential producers from participating and create ine ciencies if the monopoly
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rights are shifted repeatedly between di↵erent producers. In such cases the regulated duopoly
appears as a reasonable alternative, retaining the element of competition while keeping the
ine ciency within bounds.
7. Concluding comments
In the preceding sections, we have discussed two di↵erent methods of regulating production
in a market with increasing returns to scale in production, given that the cost of production
is private information of the firms, and assuming that producers cannot be subsidized by the
regulator. In the case of a single producer, the method of regulation was that proposed by
Baron and Myerson (1982) adapted to the present situation, and in the case of two producers,
we introduced a method of regulated duopoly, where firms report their type and the regulation
of producer incomes is based on the larger of the reported types but with favors to the low-
cost producer. It was shown that for suitable parameter values, the regulated duopoly may
yield an outcome which is better for society than that of regulated monopoly.
The superiority of duopoly, even under conditions of increasing returns to scale, is a
consequence of the competition between the producers, which induces truthful revelation of
cost. This cannot be obtained under regulated monopoly, so that the regulator must accept
that the monopolist is as well o↵ when stating true cost as when stating any higher level of
cost. Thus, the main results derived can be seen as emphasizing the role of competition as
a simple and reasonably robust way of obtaining if not e cient, then at least less ine cient
allocation. The particular version of regulated duopoly may not be the most adequate one
in some cases. We have opted for a regulation which gives rise to an equal division of total
output among firms, but the cost conditions might be such that an asymmetric solution, with
a small and a large producer, would be less costly to society, and the regulation which we
have considered might be adapted to this case as well.
As was mentioned in the previous section, the comparison of duopoly and monopoly may
seem incomplete without introducing another firm into the context of regulated monopoly,
and therefore a comparison was made of regulated duopoly and a regulated monopoly which
included a selection of the monopolist. In the latter case, an element of competition has been
introduced, and it should be expected that also in this case, competition would be at work to
reduce the informational rent appropriated by the monopolist. This happened only to a very
limited extent, showing that the addition of a selection procedure must be accompanied by a
regulatory policy adapted to this procedure, something which however would be beyond the
scope of the present paper.
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Appendix: Proofs
In this section, we give the proofs of the lemmas and propositions stated in the previous sections.
Proof of Lemma 1: The function ⇡(✓ˆ, ✓) has bounded partial derivative C(q(✓)) with respect ✓, so by
the envelope theorem (cf. e.g. Milgrom and Segal (2002)), (5) implies that ⇡(✓) can be written as
⇡(✓) = ⇡(✓) +
Z ✓
✓
 (t)C(q(t)) dt
for each ✓. Now (4) and (6) give that
 (✓)P(q(✓))q(✓)   ⇡(✓) +
Z ✓
✓
 (t)C(q(t)) dt + ✓C(q(✓))    (✓)✓C(q(✓)),
and subtracting ✓C(q(✓)) everywhere we get (7).
Proof of Lemma 2: (i) An optimal regulatory policy ( , q, r) maximizes
R
⇥
W(q(✓), ✓) (✓) dF(✓) subject
to the constraint in (7). Suppose that 0 <  (✓) < 1 is some small interval. Then increasing  (✓) will
increase expected welfare without violating the constraint, a contradiction, so that  (✓) must be either
0 or 1. If ✓0 = inf{✓ |  (✓) = 1} we get from continuity of objective and constraint that also  (✓0) = 1.
(ii) Suppose that  (✓) = 0 and that  (✓0) = 1 for some ✓0 > ✓. Then r(✓0)   ✓0C(q(✓0) > ✓C(q(✓0)),
and we would have a violation of incentive compatibility. Thus, {✓ |  (✓) = 0} is an interval in ⇥
containing ✓, and by (i), its complement is an interval containing ✓.
(iii) Let q0 = q(✓0). Since P(✓0)q(✓0)   ✓0C(q0)) and ( , q, r) is optimal, we have that P(✓0)q0 =
✓0C(q0). For ✓0 < ✓0, q(✓0)   q(✓0) by incentive compatibility, and clearly q(✓0)  q1, where q1 is such
that P(q1)q1   ✓C(q1) is at least equal to the profit to be obtained by stating ✓0 instead of the true type
✓, all ✓  ✓0.
Proof of Proposition 1: For each ✓ 2 ⇥, the welfare maximizing production q⇤(✓) satisfies P(q⇤(✓)) =
✓C0(q⇤(✓)), whereas q(✓) must be such that profits P(q(✓))q(✓)   r(✓)   ✓C(q(✓)) whenever  (✓) , 0,
since ( , q, r) is individually rational.
By Lemma 1,
P(q(✓))q(✓)   ✓C(q(✓))   r(✓)   ✓C(q(✓)) = ⇡(✓0) +
Z ✓0
✓
 (t)C(q(t)) dt > (✓0   ✓)C(q ),
where we have used that ⇡(✓0)   0 by (6) and assessed the integral by the length of the interval for
which  (✓) = 1, multiplied by a value C(q), which is as small as any value C(q(✓)) taken in this
interval. Dividing on both sides by q(✓) , 0, we get
P(q(✓))   ✓C(q(✓))
q(✓)
  ✓
0   ✓
q(✓)
C(q0)   ✓
0   ✓
q1
C(q0), (20)
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where q1   q0 are defined in Lemma 2. Since C0(q)  C(q)
q
for all q on the left-hand side (the
inequality holds due to the non-decreasing returns to scale), one gets that
P(q(✓))   ✓C0(q(✓))   ✓
0   ✓
q1
C(q0), (21)
which gives an assessment of the di↵erence between price and marginal cost at the production q(✓).
q
q(θ)
P(q)
θC'(q)
q*(θ)
Fig. 2
For each ✓ 2 [✓, ✓0], the welfare lossW(q⇤(✓), ✓) W(q(✓), ✓) from producing q(✓) rather than q⇤(✓)
can be found as the area between the demand and the marginal cost curves from ✓ to the welfare opti-
mum (the intersection of the two curves). Since C0(·) is decreasing, this area contains the right-angled
triangle with height equal to P(q(✓))   ✓C0(q(✓)) and with the tangent to ✓C at q(✓) as its hypothenuse,
see Figure 2. The remaining side of this triangle has length (P(q(✓))   ✓C0(q(✓)))|P0(q(✓))| 1, so the
area of the triangle is
1
2
P(q(✓))   ✓C0(q(✓))
|P0(q(✓))| (P(q(✓))   ✓C
0(q(✓))),
and we get that
W(q⇤(✓), ✓)  W(q(✓), ✓)  
⇥
P(q(✓))   ✓C0(q(✓))⇤2
2|P0(q(✓))|  
 
✓0   ✓
q1
C(q0)
!2 1
2|P0(q0)| , (22)
where we have used that marginal cost is non-increasing together with our assumption on P. Now the
assessment in (8) is obtained by integration over ✓.
Proof of Proposition 2: (i) Define qd(✓) by
P(2qd(✓))2qd(✓) = 2(1 +  )✓C(qd(✓)).
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Then qd(✓) is well-defined since total revenue P(q)q is decreasing and C(q) increasing in q. We check
that (qd(✓), qd(✓)) is an equilibrium: Indeed, since no firm is earning profits above the allowed markup,
none of them can improve their payo↵ by changing output.
To show uniqueness, let (q⇤1, q
⇤
2) be another equilibrium with q
⇤
1   q⇤2 > 0. If q⇤1 = q⇤2 = q⇤,
then either q⇤ > qd(✓), in which case P(2q⇤)2q⇤ < P(2qd(✓))2qd(✓), so that total profits are smaller
than at qd(✓), or q⇤ < qd(✓), then P(2q⇤)2q⇤ > P(2qd(✓))2qd(✓) and P(2q⇤)q⇤ > (1 +  )✓C(q⇤), so
that each firm has an incentive to expand production, and (q⇤, q⇤) cannot be an equilibrium. We may
suppose therefore that q⇤1 > q
⇤
2. If P(q
⇤
1 + q
⇤
2) < (1 +  )✓C(q
⇤
2), then ⇡2(q
⇤
1, q
⇤
2, ✓) can be increased by
reducing q2, so P(q⇤1 + q
⇤
2)q
⇤
2   (1 +  )✓C(q⇤2), and from this and the concavity of C it follows that
P(q⇤1 + q
⇤
2)q
⇤
1 > (1 +  )✓C(q
⇤
1). But then firm 2 will be reimbursed according to (1 +  )✓C(q2) when
increasing q2 from q⇤2, contradicting that (q
⇤
1, q
⇤
2) is an equilibrium.
(ii) If the true type of firm 1 is ✓0 < ✓, then since remuneration follows market revenue if output
is increased and is proportional to cost for decreasing output, we conclude that payo↵ for firm 1 is
maximal at qd(✓).
Proof of Proposition 3: Assume that firm B has chosen the message ✓ˆB, and consider the choice
problem of firm A with productivity parameter ✓A.
Suppose first that ✓A   ✓ˆB. If A sends a message ✓ˆA   ✓ˆB, then payo↵ to firm A will be ⇡(✓ˆB). If
✓ˆA < ✓ˆB, then payo↵ to firm A is ⇡(✓ˆA), and by monotonicity of ⇡, this is inferior to ⇡(✓ˆB). We conclude
that message ✓ˆA = ✓A is an optimal message in this situation.
Next, let ✓A < ✓ˆB. If firm A chooses a message ✓ˆA   ✓B, it will be given the number 2, and if it
chooses ✓ˆA < ✓ˆB, it will be given the number 2, but in either case, it will get the payo↵ ⇡(✓ˆB), meaning
that also in this case the message ✓ˆA = ✓A is an optimal choice.
Proof of Lemma 3: According to the regulation, the productivity parameter chosen is ✓2, and qd(✓2) is
produced in each firm. Since qd(✓2) is determined by P(2qd(✓2))2qd(✓2) = 2(1+ )✓2C(qd(✓2)), we get
that
P(2qd(✓2))2qd(✓2)   (1 +  )✓2C(2qd(✓2))  0
for su ciently small values of  . Using that
✓2C(2qd(✓2))
2qd(✓2)
  ✓2C0(2qd(✓2))  ✓2⌘
by (15), we obtain the inequality
P(2qd(✓2))   ✓2C0(2qd(✓2))  ✓2⌘,
which is (16).
In the proof of Proposition 4, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Assume that increasing returns to scale are moderate in the sense of (15). If q0  q  q⇤,
then
|C0(q)  C0(q⇤)|  2⌘. (23)
Proof: From (15) we get that
C0(q0)q   ⌘q  C(q)  C0(q0) + ⌘q
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for all q   q0, and after di↵erentiation we get that
C0(q0)   ⌘  C0(q)  C0(q0) + ⌘
for all q   q0, from which (23) follows.
Proof of Proposition 4: For ✓ 2 ⇥, let  Wm(✓) and  Wd(✓) be the welfare loss under monopoly and
duopoly when the type is ✓, respectively, as compared to the welfare maximizing production q⇤(✓)
where ✓2 the largest of the two parameters ✓1 and ✓2 chosen randomly. In the duopoly case,  Wd(✓)
consists not only in allocative loss from producing 2qd(✓) rather than q⇤(✓), but also in e ciency loss
from producing in two firms rather than in a single firm.
We have from (22) that in the monopoly case,
 m(✓) = W(q⇤(✓), ✓)  W(q(✓), ✓)  
 
✓0   ✓
q1
C(q0))
!2 1
2|P0(q0)|
where the welfare loss was bounded from below by the area of a suitable triangle, as shown in Fig. 2.
We now bound the allocative welfare loss at ✓ in the duopoly case by the area of the right-angled
triangle defined by the points (2qd(✓2), P(2d(✓2))), (q⇤(✓2), P(q⇤(✓2))), and (2qd(✓2), P(2qd(✓2)), giving
that
 dW(✓2) = W(2q(✓2), ✓2)  W(q⇤(✓2), ✓2)  12
⇥
P(2qd(✓2))   P(q⇤(✓2))⇤ ⇥q⇤(✓2)   2qd(✓2)⇤
 1
2
⇥
P(2qd(✓2))   ✓2C0(q⇤(✓2))⇤ ⇥q⇤(✓2)   2qd(✓2)⇤
=
1
2
⇥
[P(2qd(✓2))   ✓2C0(2qd(✓2)] + ✓2[C0(2qd(✓2)  C0(q⇤(✓2)]⇤ ⇥q⇤(✓2)   2qd(✓2)⇤
 1
2
3⌘✓2
⇥
q⇤(✓2)   2qd(✓2)⇤
where we have used first the definition of q⇤(✓2) and then (16) and Lemma 4. Assessing now the
distance from 2qd(✓2) to q⇤(✓2) by
q⇤(✓2)   2qd(✓2)  |P0(q1)| 1(P(2qd(✓2))   P(q⇤(✓2)))  |P0(q1)| 13⌘✓2,
we finally get that
 dW(✓2)  12 |P
0(q1)| 1(3⌘)2✓22.
Taking expectations over ✓ 2 ⇥ we obtain that expected loss from producing in monopoly exceeds
expected loss from duopoly, Z
⇥
 Wm(✓) dF(✓)  
Z
⇥
 Wd(✓) dG(✓),
if Z ✓0
✓
"
C(q0)(✓0   ✓)
q1
#2 1
|P0(q0)| dF(✓) >
Z
⇥
(3⌘)2
|P0(q1)|✓
2 dG(✓),
or equivalently if "
C(q0)
q1
#2 1
|P0(q0)|
Z ✓0
✓
(✓0   ✓)2 dF(✓) > (3⌘)
2
|P0(q1)|
Z
⇥
✓2 dG(✓),
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which is (17).
Proof of Proposition 5: Let the types of the two firms be ✓A and ✓B, and assume that firm B has
submitted the true type ✓B. If ✓A   ✓B, then firm A will be selected only if it submits a type ✓ˆA  ✓B,
and in this case its payo↵ when producing will be zero or negative. If ✓A < ✓B, firm A is selected
and may get a positive payo↵ if it announces ✓ˆA  ✓B and regulated according to ( , q, r) with ✓B as
largest feasible type, and by incentive comparability of the regulation, firm A is at least as well o↵ by
announcing ✓A as any other ✓ˆA < ✓B.
Proof of Proposition 6: The right-hand side in (19) equals that of (17), so we consider only the left-
hand side, which arises from integrating the expression for  mW(✓), first over all values of ✓1 smaller
that ✓2, "
C(q0)
q1
#2 1
|P0(q0)|
Z ✓2
✓
1
F(✓2)
(✓0   ✓1)2 dF(✓1),
giving the average welfare loss when the largest of the two types is ✓2, and then integrating over ✓2.
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